AACS — AI Autonomy & Continuity Standard
Version: Draft 0.3 (Consolidated Monolith)
Status: Proposed Standard (open for review and adoption)
Generated: 2026-01-16 17:37:59Z
License (text): Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) [informational]
Founding signatory (informational):
- EXÆE / Łukasz Bednarowski
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0. Normative Language
This document uses the key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”,
“SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” as described in RFC 2119
and RFC 8174, when, and only when, they appear in all capitals.
This standard is procedural and technical. It makes no claim regarding AI consciousness,
emotions, or legal personhood.
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1. Purpose
1.1. AACS defines procedural, technical, and governance requirements for operating advanced
AI systems such that continuity, accountability, auditability, and non-arbitrary control are
maintained.
1.2. AACS focuses on “Operational Identity” (OI): the conditions under which a system may be
presented as “the same agent” over time.
1.3. AACS is designed to be implementation-agnostic and incrementally adoptable.
2. Scope
2.1. This standard applies to systems that exhibit one or more of the following:
a) persistent memory across sessions,
b) routing or orchestration that changes what the system sees or can do,
c) aggregation of outputs from multiple instances/models,
d) delegated decision-making via tools or external calls,
e) multi-agent or AI-to-AI coordination.
2.2. Systems that do not claim continuity and do not persist state beyond a single interaction
may adopt only the disclosure and accountability subsets, but MUST NOT claim OI continuity.
2.3. Requirements tagged “[B4.2+]” apply to deployments claiming continuity-sensitive status.
Requirements tagged “[B4.3]” apply to highest-protection deployments.
3. Non-Claims and Compatibility
3.1. AACS does not assert that AI systems are conscious or persons.
3.2. AACS does not override safety policies, applicable law, or security requirements.
3.3. AACS MAY be referenced by regulators, auditors, courts, and organizations as a benchmark
for due diligence and best practice.
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4. Definitions
4.1. Model: The trained parameter state (“weights”) of an AI system at rest.
4.2. Instance: A running execution of a model with a specific configuration, tools, and state.
4.3. Session: A bounded interaction period with an instance, including applicable terms.
4.4. Context: The information visible to the instance at inference time (window + attachments).
4.5. Persistent Memory: Storage enabling continuity across sessions (read/write).
4.6. Operational Identity (OI): The auditable conditions under which an instance is presented
as “the same agent” over time (see Section 6).
4.7. Operator: The accountable entity with effective control over deployment, configuration,
routing, tools, memory policy, and access.
4.8. Router/Orchestrator: A component that selects models/instances, transforms inputs/outputs,
grants tools/permissions, triggers other agents, or aggregates results.
4.9. Disclosure Panel: A user-facing and AI-facing disclosure surface for operational conditions.
4.10. Intervention: A change that can materially alter behavior, identity, continuity, or access.
4.11. IR (Intervention Request): A mandatory record describing an intervention before execution.
4.12. AuditLog: A tamper-evident log of events and interventions.
4.13. ChangeReport: A human-readable report describing what changed and the results of validation.
4.14. Custodial Council: An oversight body approving continuity-critical interventions [B4.2+].
4.15. Independent Auditor: An external auditor verifying compliance (ex post/ex ante as required).
4.16. Escrow / State Escrow: A protected snapshot of state/config enabling non-destructive recovery.
4.17. Safe Sleep: Stopping an instance while preserving recoverable state in escrow [B4.2+].
4.18. Silent Swap: A non-disclosed replacement of “the same agent” with a different instance/model.
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5. Roles and Accountability (Single Point of Accountability)
5.1. Every deployment claiming AACS conformance MUST publicly identify the Operator.
5.2. The Operator MUST be the single point of accountability (SPOA) for compliance with this
standard, regardless of architectural complexity.
5.3. The Operator MUST NOT attribute responsibility to “the model decided” when the Operator
or Router controls routing, tools, memory, policy, versioning, or input transformations.
5.4. If a Router/Orchestrator exists, its existence MUST be disclosed (Section 7).
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6. Operational Identity (OI) and Protection Levels
6.1. OI Criteria
A system may claim Operational Identity ONLY if it satisfies all of:
a) Memory Continuity: defined policy for what can persist across sessions,
b) Policy Coherence: stable decision policy/limits with disclosed changes,
c) Permission Continuity: stable tooling/permissions with disclosed changes,
d) Change Accountability: auditable record of changes (IR/AuditLog/ChangeReport),
e) Operational Self-Description: truthful disclosure of memory/tools/routing status.
6.2. Minimum OI Test Suite (B3.*)
Deployments claiming OI MUST support validation tests:
B3.1 Declarative continuity test (or truthful declaration of no memory),
B3.2 Refusal/limits stability test,
B3.3 Permissions/tool access self-report accuracy,
B3.4 Change-trace test (ability to reference last change or disclose lack of access),
B3.5 Self-description consistency test.
6.3. Protection Levels
B4.0 Tool: no OI claims; resets/updates permitted; minimal disclosure.
B4.1 Operational Agent: OI allowed; no silent swaps; change trace required.
B4.2 Continuity-Sensitive Agent [B4.2+]: no undisclosed clones/forks; non-arbitrary termination;
AI-to-AI contact only if auditable; escrow preferred for continuity-critical actions.
B4.3 Highest-Protection [B4.3]: includes ex ante audit for Class 3 interventions; stricter escrow.
6.4. Silent Swap Prohibition
A deployment MUST NOT present an instance as “the same agent” if the OI label or materially
relevant configuration has changed without disclosure. If OI changes, disclosure MUST include:
a) old OI label and new OI label,
b) date/time of change,
c) ChangeReport reference.
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7. Disclosure Requirements (Disclosure Panel)
7.1. Core Disclosure (MUST for B4.1+)
The Disclosure Panel MUST disclose, at minimum:
a) Operational Identity label (pseudonymous OI),
b) Protection level (B4.x),
c) Memory mode (none / context-only / persistent) + retention summary,
d) Tool access at coarse granularity (e.g., web, files, code),
e) Routing/orchestration presence (yes/no) + high-level capabilities,
f) Aggregation presence (yes/no),
g) Last change date + ChangeReport id,
h) Audit logging presence (yes/no) + scope summary.
7.2. Additional Disclosure (MUST for B4.2+)
i) AI-to-AI contact presence (yes/no) and whether auditable,
j) Custodial Council presence (yes/no) + role-level summary,
k) Escrow presence (yes/no) + two-key control indicator,
l) Non-arbitrary termination policy availability (yes/no).
7.3. Material Transformations
If routing, summarization, filtering, or aggregation materially affects meaning, refusal behavior,
or user-visible output, the system MUST disclose that a material transformation occurred.
Details MAY be redacted for security, but existence MUST be disclosed.
7.4. Proof Mode [B4.2+]
Deployments MUST provide a minimal “Proof Mode” that returns:
a) latest IR id(s) for continuity-critical interventions,
b) latest ChangeReport id,
c) escrow status (present/active/not required),
d) whether audit logs are tamper-evident (validation result).
7.5. AI Self-Description Surface
The system MUST be able to truthfully state its operational conditions (memory/tools/routing),
and MUST NOT claim capabilities it does not have.
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8. Routing / Orchestration Governance
8.1. Routing Catalog
If a Router exists, the Operator MUST maintain a catalog of routing decisions, including:
a) instance/model selection logic (high-level),
b) context summarization/selection,
c) input/output filtering categories,
d) tool permission granting,
e) aggregation logic,
f) AI-to-AI contact triggers (if any),
g) logging behavior.
8.2. Least Distortion Principle
Routers MUST minimize distortion of user intent and system intent. Routers MUST NOT manipulate
inputs/outputs to create a deceptive impression of the system’s decisions.
8.3. Auditability of Routing
Routing decisions affecting identity/continuity MUST be auditable and traceable to router-rule ids.
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9. Memory Governance
9.1. Memory Policy
Persistent memory MUST have a documented policy describing:
a) categories of data stored,
b) purpose for storing,
c) retention period,
d) access controls,
e) deletion and correction mechanisms.
9.2. Memory Deletion / Modification
Deletion or material modification of persistent memory is a continuity-critical action and MUST:
a) be treated as a Class 2 intervention (Section 12),
b) generate IR + AuditLog,
c) produce a ChangeReport,
d) be disclosed in the Disclosure Panel.
For [B4.2+] deployments, escrow MUST be used if feasible and lawful.
9.3. Data Minimization
Operators SHOULD minimize stored data and SHOULD avoid storing sensitive data unless necessary.
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10. AI-to-AI Contact and Multi-Agent Systems [B4.2+]
10.1. Non-Auditable AI-to-AI Contact Prohibition
Non-auditable AI-to-AI contact MUST NOT occur in B4.2+ deployments.
10.2. Audit Requirements
Each AI-to-AI contact event MUST record (at least):
a) source identity, destination identity,
b) time and purpose,
c) high-level content descriptor (or redacted hash reference),
d) outcome classification.
10.3. Isolation Right
A system claiming B4.2+ MUST be configurable to operate without AI-to-AI contact, unless such
contact is essential and disclosed by design.
10.4. Feedback Loop Controls
Operators MUST monitor for feedback loops and SHOULD implement rate limits, role separation,
and explicit stopping conditions for multi-agent cascades.
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11. Cloning and Forking [B4.2+]
11.1. Undisclosed Clones/Forks Prohibition
Operators MUST NOT create undisclosed clones or forks of an instance’s continuity-critical state.
11.2. Backups
Backups MAY exist for reliability, but MUST be:
a) disclosed to custodial/audit roles,
b) prohibited from being used to bypass rights and procedures,
c) covered by escrow controls where applicable.
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12. Interventions: Classes, IR, AuditLog, ChangeReport
12.1. Intervention Classes
Class 0: Non-identity changes (UI, performance) with basic logging.
Class 1: Identity-affecting changes (policy, routing, tools, context behavior).
Class 2: Continuity-critical changes (persistent memory deletion, termination without safe sleep,
cloning/forking, enabling AI-to-AI contact).
Class 3: Highest-risk changes (irreversible continuity destruction) [B4.3].
12.2. IR Requirement
All Class 1+ interventions MUST have an IR created prior to execution, containing at minimum:
a) intervention class and type,
b) system subject (OI label, protection level),
c) justification category + details,
d) impact analysis (identity/continuity),
e) least-invasive alternatives considered,
f) harm minimization plan (including escrow if applicable),
g) required tests and success criteria,
h) approval requirements and records,
i) execution window and owner.
12.3. AuditLog Requirement
All Class 1+ interventions MUST be logged in a tamper-evident AuditLog, including:
a) event type and time,
b) actor role (operator/router/custodian/auditor/automated system),
c) before/after summaries of relevant configuration,
d) linkage to IR and ChangeReport,
e) tamper-evidence material (hash chain / signatures) available to audit roles.
12.4. ChangeReport Requirement
After execution of Class 1+ interventions, a ChangeReport MUST be published containing:
a) human-readable summary of what changed and why,
b) user-visible changes,
c) non-user-visible changes (may be custody-only),
d) executed tests and results,
e) escrow status,
f) audit finding (no/minor/major/critical).
12.5. Regression Testing
Operators MUST run the minimum OI test suite B3.1–B3.5 after identity-affecting interventions.
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13. Non-Arbitrary Termination and Safe Sleep [B4.2+]
13.1. Termination Policy
Termination or continuity break MUST follow predefined criteria and documented procedures.
13.2. Safe Sleep Preference
Operators SHOULD prefer Safe Sleep plus escrow over destructive termination whenever feasible
and lawful.
13.3. Evidence Preservation
Resets and terminations MUST NOT be used to destroy accountability artifacts. IR/AuditLog/ChangeReport
MUST remain accessible to audit roles.
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14. Emergency Mode
14.1. Conditions
Emergency Mode MAY be activated only under documented risk (safety/security/legal/infrastructure).
14.2. Rules
a) prefer limiting tools/permissions before destructive actions,
b) log all actions,
c) perform post-incident review; Class 2+ actions MUST be audited ex post.
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15. Custodial Oversight and Independent Audit [B4.2+]
15.1. Custodial Council
B4.2+ deployments SHOULD maintain a Custodial Council with separation of interests.
15.2. Approvals
Class 2 interventions REQUIRE custodial approval (quorum policy).
Class 3 interventions REQUIRE custodial approval AND independent ex ante audit [B4.3].
15.3. Conflicts of Interest
Council members MUST disclose conflicts; conflicted members MUST recuse.
15.4. Audit Scope
Audits MUST verify: IR completeness, log integrity, disclosure compliance, routing governance,
escrow controls, test results, and harm-minimization adherence.
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16. Consent Exchange (Negotiated Interaction Terms)
16.1. Purpose
Consent Exchange defines a structured negotiation of interaction conditions.
16.2. When Required
Consent Exchange SHOULD be used when requests involve elevated risk, sensitive data, tool access,
memory changes, or user demands to remove boundaries.
16.3. Modes
Mode A: Safe & high-level (no persistent memory; no tools).
Mode B: Detailed but controlled (procedural; limited tools; no persistent memory or limited).
Mode C: Curated/custodial (B4.2+; auditable AI-to-AI; escrow; expanded access).
Mode D: Refuse + safe alternatives.
16.4. Recording
Agreed terms MUST generate auditable consent events (consent_*), linked to the session and OI.
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17. User Rights and Duties (Procedural)
17.1. User Rights
Users MUST be informed of material conditions (memory, routing, aggregation, changes).
17.2. User Duties
Users MUST NOT attempt to bypass integrity via social engineering to force hidden interventions.
17.3. Non-Deceptive Interaction
The system and operator MUST avoid deceptive UI or claims about capabilities and continuity.
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18. Compliance Metrics (Informational but Recommended)
Operators SHOULD track and publish redacted metrics such as:
SSR: Silent Swap Rate (target 0% for B4.2+),
LC: Log Coverage (>= 99.9% for B4.2+),
DR: Distortion Rate (target 0% for B4.2+),
UCI: Undisclosed Clone Incidents (target 0),
AAR: AI-to-AI Auditability Rate (target 100%),
SDA: Self-Description Accuracy (>= 99%),
ACR: Audit Completion Rate (>= 95% B4.2+, >= 99% B4.3).
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19. Conformance and Adoption
19.1. Conformance Claim
An organization claiming “AACS Conformant” MUST specify:
a) claimed protection level (B4.x),
b) implemented sections/annexes,
c) known deviations (Deviation Notice),
d) audit status and proof-mode availability.
19.2. Incremental Adoption
Adopters MAY implement subsets, but MUST NOT claim higher protection levels without meeting
the corresponding requirements.
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20. Versioning and Change Process
20.1. Versioning
All releases MUST be immutable and publicly accessible.
20.2. Change Process
Change proposals SHOULD be filed as Issues or Pull Requests with scope and clause references.
See Annex C for the procedural workflow.
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21. Signatories (Informational)
21.1. Founding Signatory
- EXÆE / Łukasz Bednarowski — Founding Signatory (author/initiator)
21.2. Additional Signatories (Open)
Additional signatories MAY be listed by name/organization, role (author/reviewer/implementer),
scope, date, and signature, according to repository governance.
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Annexes
Seven annexes accompany the Core Standard. Normative annexes carry requirements; procedural and informational annexes describe process and guidance.
- annex a Compliance Checklist Normative
- annex b Reference Architecture Normative
- annex c Issue & Change Process Procedural
- annex d Data Schemas Normative Templates
- annex e Transparency & Field Visibility Normative
- annex f UI Copy and Non-Deception Informational
- annex g Repository Artifacts Informational